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cerned with matters of literary value and wastes no sympathy on them.
He asserts that Mishkin's books are prurient trash, and that Ginzberg
was clearly pandering.24
In a closing chapter the author reflects briefly upon the world
beyond the end of obscenity. He suggests first that a scintilla of evi-
dence of value may not satisfy the "utterly without any value" test. The
value must be discernible and demonstrable and must pervade the
work-not just a few paragraphs. 25 Secondly, he suggests that other
media may also pose problems of invasion of privacy or public decency,
and that different results may follow from litigation involving these.
Perhaps obscenity law has been too preoccupied with erotic
effect, the appeal to prurient interest and the clear and present danger
of some unlawful act. Also at stake is an aesthetic interest and an
interest in privacy. As the author puts it:
ET]hat public things should be decent is not, intrinsically a bad idea.
Perhaps the orthodox libertarian will find the idea more acceptable if it
is put it. terms of aesthetics. Consider it a form of zoning .... In public,
a variety of rights run their course, and the traffic must be regulated.
Along with the right of privacy, there can be said to be a duty of
privacy.
2 6
Paul Oberst
Professor of Law
University of Kentucky
FmM CENSORS AND THE LAw. By Neville March Hunnings. New York:
Hilary House, 1968. Pp. 474. $12.50.
CENsoRsmrP OF THE MovEs: THE SOCIAL AND POIrnCAL CONTROL OF
A MAss MEDruM. By Richard S. Randall. Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1968. Pp. xvi, 280. $7.95.
These two recently published volumes on film censorship provide a
number of contrasts. The Hunnings work is descriptive, with little
analysis; the Randall book contains much factual material thoroughly
analyzed. The former deals with several countries, the latter only with
the United States. The former is narrowly legal, while the latter deals
not only with the law but also with movies as a medium of com-
munication in a democratic society. Perhaps the largest difference is
24 Id. at 407-08, 428-34, 484-85.
251d. at 489.
261d. at 511.
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that Hunnings' book is a crashing bore while Randal's is exciting and
adds much to what we already know.
The principal fault of Film Censors and the Law is that its author
has not taken the time to organize a framework within which to in-
corporate the many miniscule facts with which he deals. One finds
long quotations from statutes and regulations (sometimes interrupted
by only a few lines of text) with little explanation of what led to
them and much superficial history with no underlying theme.
In England, the country to which Hunnings devotes the most at-
tention, early control of the movies came through regulation of music
halls, where films were first shown, because of fire danger from the
buildings and the film itself. When the English film industry's efforts
to get the Home Office to act as an appellate censor and thus legiti-
mator for the industry were rebuffed, an industry-sponsored board
utilizing a seal of approval was created. Unlike the American Pro-
duction Code Authority (PCA), the British board relies on certain
general principles, rather than utilizing a fully developed code.
Hunnings asserts that although the English film board is technically
independent it is actually dependent on the trade, local authorities, and
private groups-but one finds no explanation with respect to either the
trade or private groups. The author does discuss thoroughly the in-
dustry's problem with local city councils which are often unwilling to
surrender the power of ultimate judgment, thus scuttling attempts
at national government censorship. (The local boards do, however,
generally accept the film board's rulings.)
Hunnings claims it is unimportant for us to know which films are
banned. If one is to get an accurate picture of censorship, one must
know more than what led historically to present rules and what those
rules are. How they are applied-what the rules are in practice-is
crucial. Hunnings also does not deal with the day-to-day work of
censorship groups; to ignore social pressures for censorship is to pro-
vide a sadly elliptical picture. These defects might be forgiven if
Hunnings had produced a solid piece of legal analysis or a thorough
description of the administrative aspects of censorship, but the book
generally does not meet standards of good scholarship in the field of
constitutional law.
In no sense can the book be called comparative. Hunnings claims
that "each [national] system must be considered from the point of
view of its own social, political and legal environment,"' an approach
which would stress each country's idiosyncracies rather than its
similarities to other nations, but Hunnings does not look at the various
1 N. HuNNIcs, Fi.m CENsORS Am Tm LAw 392 (1968).
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countries even in the terms he has proposed. England, four federal
countries (United States, India, Canada, Australia), and three
European countries (Denmark, France, Soviet Union) are the ones
with which Hunnings deals. This classification might make sense if it
were related to different types of censorship, but it generally is not.
For each country, one is given the same tedious description of basic
law and comes away having learned very little about why censorship
takes the form it does. Some attempt to analyze differences between
the countries is made in the last chapter, where the importance of
central government-local government power relations is stressed. How-
ever, this discussion is insufficient to redeem the lack of analysis in
the remainder of the volume.
In writing about the United States, Hunnings describes legal de-
velopments in individual states before discussing Supreme Court cases,
surely an inverse treatment. The English reader will benefit from his
development of the extension of the First Amendment through the
Fourteenth Amendment as a prohibition against the states, one of the
book's less equivocal portions. Hunnings claims the PCA provided the
movie industry "breathing space" against demands for censorship,
although he recognizes it is less effective now than earlier because of
the trend against censorship in judicial decisions. He also feels it now
is carried along only by its own momentum. He hardly mentions
American private groups interested in censorship, the exception being
a brief reference to the Legion of Decency's pressure on the PCA
years ago. (In comparing Russia and the United States, Hunnings
makes an effort to compare the Communist Party's pressure to that of
the American Catholic Church, but calling the Russian Communist
Party "an unofficial group"2 is hardly accurate.)
In concluding, Hunnings adopts the standard libertarian doctrine
and argues that "if a country is to have a film censorship, it is more
consonant with freedom of speech that it should not be con-
trolled by the government."3 If one were to ignore "informal" censor-
ship, Hunnings' argument might be valid; if one sees the severe effect
informal censorship can have, one is far more cautious. Hunnings also
claims that the issue of prior restraint versus subsequent criminal
punishment has been so much discussed that nothing can be added.
Randall clearly shows that more can be said than has been written
previously, just as he raises a serious question about Hunnings' above-
mentioned assertion by discussing informal censorship.
Randall's interesting and well presented thesis is that prior re-
21d. at 386.
8 Id. at 394.
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straint (with proper controls) can serve as a protection against more
virulent and/or erratic censorship pressures from private groups. While
this argument would have some validity even without tightened pro-
cedural safeguards in the licensing area, it is even more accurate now
in the light of the Freedman case,4 because the government must now
bear the burden of showing that a movie should be denied a license by
going to court to get the censor's order upheld.
Unlike Hunnings, Randall appreciates the full range of censor-
ship: censorship exists not only in law, but also in self-censorship, the
extra-legal activities of public officials, group action of both public
and private varieties, as well as patron and parental sovereignty
(free choice). He postulates an inverse relationship between informal
censorship and prior restraint, and the hypothesized relationship is
generally confirmed by the material he presents, although he recog-
nizes the difficulty of estimating the effect of informal control be-
cause of exhibitors" anticipatory action in the face of possible public
activity. His case concerning the dangers of informal censorship is
devastating; he shows that matters other than the film itself (adver-
tising, previous films shown by a particular theater, reviews) may
trigger informal censorship, while in prior restraint only the film is at
issue; that standards applied are far more broad and that few pro-
cedural safeguards exist in informal censorship; and that the private
citizen, dealing with only a relatively small number of films, lacks the
government censors' basis for comparison. One minor complaint: more
community studies like the one of the harrassment received by Nico
Jacobellis would have strengthened Randall's argument on the point
that informal community pressure is the most effective form of censor-
ship.
Randall also raises serious questions about the device of sub-
sequent criminal prosecution for controlling undesirable movies. The
expense of the procedure required to prosecute tends to limit its use,
while the uncertainty of not knowing what films will subject someone
to arrest affects most acutely the exhibitor, the one least able to bear
the economic burden of a case. Although distributors and producers
often contribute to or jointly handle the defense in such cases, any
type of censorship, unless centralized at the national level, is likely to
hurt the exhibitor.
The author, a political scientist, has produced an analysis condi-
tioned by a thorough understanding of movies as a medium of com-
munication. His appreciation of the operation of the movie industry is
shown by his mention of "hot" and "coor' versions of movies and his
4 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
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comment that the movies lack a control mechanism like that part play-
ed by advertising in television and the newspapers. He shows that be-
cause movies "were the first medium of communication without roots
in either elite or folk culture,"5 they became a matter of intense public
concern. That movies are a mass medium, particularly one dealing
with the same material found earlier only in books, leads Randall to
pose the philosophical question of whether a "free speech society" and
a "mass democratic society" can co-exist. Censorship interests are a
political force and cannot be either dismissed in a democratic society
or fully dealt with in a legal setting.
In all this, Randall does not ignore the law. His analysis of the
Mutual Film case0 is extremely thorough. Instead of joining the
heated ex post facto criticism others have made of the decision, he
brings law and the state of the medium together to show why the
Court decided that movies were not to be included in the protections
granted speech. Mutual Film came at the "nickelodeon stage" of the
industry's development, when no one thought that films involved dis-
semination of ideas. Thus the state of the industry affects law, but the
reverse is also true; for example, Burstyn v. Wilson (the "Miracle"
decision)7 helped stimulate sophistication in both film subject-matter
and treatment.
The newness of case law in the movie regulation area is shown
by the fact that Freedman was the first Supreme Court case dealing
with licensing procedures, although the question of prior restraint per
se had been raised earlier. While Freedman appears to deal only with
procedures, Randall shows that in effect the decision overrules the
Times Films holding that a film must be submitted for showing; in
Freedman, the exhibitor had shown the film without first submitting it,
yet the Court allowed his challenge of the Maryland law. It is a
commentary on the speed of censorship and obscenity law develop-
ments that each new book is barely off the press before some new
relevant decision is handed down. After the publication of Randall's
book, the Chicago movie censorship ordinance and the Dallas age
classification device were struck down, the former on Freedman-type
grounds,9 the latter under the doctrine of vagueness. 10 In addition,
the Court's approval in the Ginsberg case1' of New York's "harmful"
5 R. RANDALL, CENSORSH=P OF =HE MovIEs 9 (1968).6 Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230 (1915).
7 343 U.S. 495 (1952).8 Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
9 Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139 (1968).
10 Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 675 (1968).
11 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
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materials statute has clear implications for film classification and shows
the Court's willingness to deal with more than "obscenity."
Randall claims that classification places no "direct" burden on
adult freedom of expression. This, however, ignores the argument
(which Randall himself mentions later) that exhibitors won't show
a film labelled "Adults Only" because of a loss of family business.
Classification also may increase the number of "borderline" films shown,
as indicated by the increase of "Adult Only" moviehouses in Dallas
after passage of that city's classification ordinance.
In dealing with censorship in operation, Randall concentrates on
state and local levels, although there is a brief but thorough dis-
cussion of the Customs Bureau's work. This emphasis reinforces the
point that the United States is one of only a few countries without
national censorship of movies. There is a far more thorough treatment
of censorship boards and the process of distributor-censor interaction
than Carmen12 showed. That Randall discusses censorship practices
topically and comparatively, rather than board-by-board, contributes
greatly to our understanding. Description of the application of
standards shows how narrowly circumscribed substantively (as well as
procedurally) censorship has become. Censors now follow religious
groups' feelings less, and little pressure is brought by groups directly
on the censors because there is little room in which censorship boards
may maneuver because of present court rulings. Government lawyers
are also a restraining influence on the censors, because they realize the
difficulties of taking the censors' decisions to court and winning.
Like Hunnings, Randall shows the loss of effectiveness of the PCA
code, attributing it to successful anti-trust action against picture
companies13 and the feeling that the companies mainipulate the code
for themselves. The code has, however, been more restrictive than the
law: no obscenity cases involving movies granted "the seal" have
occurred; movies not submitted for approval become the subject of
cases. PCA effectiveness is greatest, Randall asserts, in the pre-pro-
duction stage (the same stage at which Russian censorship operates).
The purpose of movie industry self-regulation is not censorship, Ran-
dall argues convincingly, but protection against economic loss. In this
connection, he notes the conflict of goals which ratings (the "Green
Sheet") pose for the industry; they have public relations value but
become an economic liability to the extent they serve as a classification
device and limit audiences. Movie exhibitors are not, it should also be
12 1. CARMMN, MovMs, CENSORSHIP, A ND rm LAw (1966), reviewed, Wasby,
56 KY L.J. 249 (1967).
13 United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
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pointed out, opposed to licensing; like book distributors, they want
guidance on ways of avoiding risks of being arrested and having to
go to court.
Randall's book is an imperative addition for the bookself of those
concerned with civil liberties, obscenity, and the mass media. Un-
fortunately, Hunnings' book, overpriced to begin with, is best not
purchased.
Stephen L. Wasby
Assistant Professor of Government
Southern Illinois University
